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1. Introduction
1. INTRODUCTION
The considerable decrease in output that followed the liberalization of prices
and foreign trade in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR,
which is called the transformational recession, has been the subject of a
number of publications which either compare dierent causes of the de-
cline (Holzman et al. (1994); Kornai (1994); Rosati (1994); Polterovich
(pOLTEROWI^ (1996)); Gomulka (1998)) or provide detailed studies of mech-
anisms of separate causes or some set of causes is conducted (Calvo and
Coricelli (1993); Chadha and Coricelli (1994); Aghion and Blanchard (1994);
Polterovich (pOLTEROWI^ (1995)); Matveenko (1995); Atkeson and Kehoe
(1996); Roland and Verdier (1997)).
Researchers still have not reached a consensus concerning the causes and
mechanisms of the decline. The following factors are often cited: the liberal-
ization of prices and foreign trade and the decrease of aggregate demand, the
collapse of the CMEA and the USSR, the decrease of government purchases
(primarily arms, energy and housing). The variety of explanations lead one to
believe that, at least in some countries, several factors acted simultaneously.
We agree with Kornai (1994) who writes that it is not possible to isolate one
single main cause for the transformational recession.
Researchers have tended to oer similar explanations for the output de-
cline in Russia as in the countries of Eastern Europe, and attribute any dif-
ferences to initial conditions (such as the degree of monopolization), and
government policies after liberalization.
There are, however, some noteworthy exceptions. Weitzman (1993) evoked
a \cultural lambda" parameter in order to capture the dierences between
China, Russia and the countries of Eastern Europe; Matveenko (1995) stud-
ied how mutual externalities partially substitute for underdeveloped market
relations in Russia; Ruhl and Vinogradov (1996) explored in a macroeco-
nomic model the idea of social cohesion; Polterovich (pOLTEROWI^ (1996))
cited Russia's collectivist relations as a factor that contributed to its reces-
sion. One hardly can doubt that unique relations between economic agents
in Russia matter for economic performance; in particular, they played a role
in the output recession in conjunction with other factors.
The transition economy can be modeled as a two-sector structure, with
state-owned enterprises belonging to the \old" sector and de novo private
rms belonging to the \new" one. Former state-owned privatized enterprises
should not be automatically ascribed to the new sector. Many enterprises were
privatized only formally (i.e., well-dened property rights were not established)
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and still have not been restructured or technologically changed; they still
belong to the old sector
1)
. Thus, the old sector does not show a tendency to be
destroyed or modied in the nearest future. At the same time, the prospects
for developing the new sector at the expense of new establishments is also
problematic because the process of starting a new enterprise is turbulent in any
economy
2)
. Hence we should not reject a principle possibility of development
of the economy on the basis of the old sector.
In this work, we follow the general logic of those authors who link the
transformational recession with changes in economic agents' behavior after
liberalization (e.g., Swaan (1996); Atkeson and Kehoe (1996); Roland and
Verdier (1997)). As Atkeson and Kehoe (1996), we attach importance to
sectoral shifts of labor. Roland and Verdier (1997) object that \such sectoral
shifts however take place in other economies and do not usually lead to such
strong output falls" and that \the evidence does not point toward strong
sectoral shifts taking place directly after liberalization." The second objection
can be disputed, at least for the case of Russia, where sectoral shifts often
take the form of part-time jobs and, therefore, are underestimated.
Existing data (see tables 1, 2) document strong inter-industrial and inter-
regional shifts of labor which appear to be connected with the sectoral shifts
under consideration
3)
.
These shifts, we nd, are accompanied by an increase in workers' reserva-
tion wage and by labor hoarding in the old sector. To explain these phenom-
ena, we construct a model of the labor market in which where we take into
account collectivist relations in the old sector of the Russian economy.
Both Atkeson and Kehoe (1996), and Roland and Verdier (1997) sug-
gest that nal states of the economy are more productive than initial ones,
and that the decline is only a transitional phenomenon. However, both these
models allow another possibility under some denite set of parameters
4)
. In
our opinion the current productivity of the new sector is low. This can be at-
tributed to its insucient technological base, its orientation to unproductive,
rent-seeking activities, and to its wish to avoid taxes by moving a part of its
1)
See Krishtanovskaya (kRY[TANOWSKAQ (1997)) for a review of stages of privatization
in Russia.
2)
According to Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) 40% of new manufacturing
plants in the USA fail in less than 5 years of their existence.
3)
Note also that the Roland{Verdier model itself may imply sectoral shifts from an old
sector (with HL links, in terms of their model) to a new sector (with HH and LL links).
4)
Atkeson and Kehoe (1996) use the example of restaurant workers in Moscow searching
to start their own business. We agree that the search will lead to an output decline, however,
we doubt that the new business will produce more output than the initial one.
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activities into the \shadow" economy (which, by itself, reduces productivity).
Separately, we consider a model in which economic activity is distributed be-
tween the \formal" and \shadow" economies in order to study the role of the
shadow economy in the decline.
Table 1.Motion of labor force in St. Petersburg, Russia (thousands of people)
Quantity in Changes in Changes in Changes in Changes in
1992 1992{93 1993{94 1994{95 1992{95
Industry production 768   22   80.7   67.3   170
Construction 274   32.5 + 21.9   14   24.6
Education and science 508.9   6.7   35.3   18   60
Trade 203 + 35.5 + 34.4 + 75.4 + 145.3
Finances 13 + 6.7 + 7.6 + 5.1 + 19.4
Control 50.6 + 3.4   3.7 + 13.3 + 13
Source: data received from the Petersburgcomstat.
Table 2. Migration balance, per mille
1992 1993 1994 1995
Russian Federation + 3.1 + 2.8 + 5.8 + 4.2
Murmansk reg.   22.7   20.5   12.5   14.3
Kamchatskaya reg.   29.3   36.5   36.6   29.0
Magadanskaya reg.   95.1   58.0   79.6   42.8
Tchukotsky auton. reg.   134.5   92.4   120.2   146.2
Belgorod reg. + 15.1 + 16.2 + 20.0 + 13.0
Voronezh reg. + 12.9 + 12.3 + 11.8 + 7.4
Krasnodarsky reg. + 19.1 + 16.4 + 18.2 + 14.2
Stavropolsky reg. + 18.1 + 15.8 + 15.8 + 13.5
Source: Analysis of Tendencies: : : (aNALIZ TENDENCIJ: : : (1996))
By highlighting the roles of collectivist relations in the old sector and
the presence of the shadow economy we do not diminish the importance of
other factors that precipitated the decline in output. If many factors acted
simultaneously, it would be a mistake to ascribe the decline to the action of
just some subset of the causes. Our work should serve as an addition to the
investigations and causal explanations of other authors. We believe, however,
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that the factors of decline studied in our work are of special signicance
because they continue to act at the present moment. It is, therefore, necessary
to take them into account when forecasting Russian growth or designing
macroeconomic policy.
In Section 2, we present and explain additional data. We also briey review
some causes and mechanisms of output decline described in the literature and
discuss how to distinguish the important from the unimportant.
In Section 3, we consider an equilibrium model of labor markets in the
\old" and the \new" sectors. We study mechanisms of output decline and
labor hoarding in the old sector directly within the framework of this model
and also consider their implications in a growth model where we observe
a possibility of patterns of decline. So far as the old sector still plays a
predominant role in the Russian economy and in many respects will dene
the country's development in the nearest future; we consider a growth/decline
model of the old sector in Subsection 3.6.
In Section 4, we present a dynamic model that takes into account the
shadow economy's role in output. The shadow economy is modeled not as an
independent sector with its own factors of production but as the unregistered
activities of rms that operate simultaneously in the regular economy.
2. TRANSFORMATIONAL DECLINE:
WHAT IS ESSENTIAL FOR ITS EXPLANATION?
The term \transformational recession" was introduced by Kornai (1994) in
order to designate the output decline that followed the liberalization in East-
ern Europe and the former USSR. The nature of this phenomenon essentially
diers from declines that have occurred periodically in market economies. We
should also note, there are considerable dierences in the degree of the \trans-
formational recessions" in the countries of Eastern Europe and in Russia. For
instance, Table 3 shows that a long and deep decline in Russia contrasts with
a rather shallow and shorter decline in Poland. Hence, it is necessary to ex-
plain not only the factors that contribute to the decline but also the causes
of its length and depth as well. The transformational recession in Poland has
ended and the question of its causes is now of a theoretical and historical
interest. But in Russia, the continued decline lends the current analysis of
the transformational recession a direct policy relevance.
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Table 3. The real GDP in Poland and in Russia (1989 = 100%)
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
Poland 96.3 100 100 92.6 86.1 88.3 91.7 96.5 103.2 109.4
Russia 95.1 99.0 100 98.0 93.1 79.6 72.7 63.5 61.1 57.4
Source: Gomulka (1998).
Several features of the decline in Russia seem to be worthy of further
consideration.
1) The decline was not accompanied by a decrease in the sale of consumer
goods (see Figure 1) and in real disposable money incomes. In addition,
the share of savings in households' incomes has been growing.
2) The unemployment level in Russia was essentially lower than in the
countries of Eastern Europe (with the exception of the Czech Republic).
In fact, at the beginning of 1994, the unemployment level in the Eastern
Europe region was up to 15%, while in Russia the number of registered
unemployed was 2%, and the unemployment level measured by surveys
did not exceed 7% (Commander and Coricelli (1995)).
3) The wages in private rms were on average higher than wages in state
rms. In this respect, Russia diers from the majority of countries of
Eastern Europe (see tables 4, 5).
4) In contrast to countries of Eastern Europe, in Russia there was no
denite period of mass-labor force migration from the state to the
private sector accompanied by growth in unemployment.
5) Secondary part-time employment (i.e., holding more than one job) has
become a common phenomenon. According to Khakhulina (hAHULINA
(1996)), the share of workers holding an additional job rose from 14{
15% in the early 1990s to 20{22%. Additional jobs appear to be more
commonly held by high-status workers. Firm managers are 1.5 times
more likely than skilled workers and 2 times more likely than unskilled
workers to hold additional jobs
5)
. The number of those who want to
nd an additional job is 2 times higher than the number of those having
such a job.
5)
Possibly, the size of the earnings of high-status workers at additional jobs makes it
necessary to declare their incomes, whereas the low-status workers do not declare their
incomes and prefer not to report their additional jobs. In this case, secondary part-time
employment may be much more than 20%. Recently it was reported that according to the
information of the State Tax Service 20 million people (that is, 25% of the whole workable
population) have more than one job (Argumenty i Facty, 1997,  42, p. 6). According
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Figure 1. Sale of consumer goods (in comparable prices, IV 1992 = 100) and the
real production of consumer goods in Russia. (Calculated due to data from
Short-Run Economic Indices, Moscow, Goskomstat, March 1996.)
Table 4. The wage in the private sector relative to the wage in the state
sector
Country 1991 1992 1993
Hungary No data 1.09 0.93
Poland 0.93 0.92 0.86
Czechoslovakia No data 1.08 No data
Russia No data 1.61 1.82
Source: Commander and Coricelli (1995).
Table 5. The wage changes in enterprises of dierent property forms (average
semi-annual growth rates, %)
State Mixed Private
1993 212 230 243
1994 143 138 143
1995 128 135 137
Source: Aukutsionek and Kapeliushnikov (1996).
to VCIOM the average quantity of hours per week spent at additional jobs in 1994{1997
was approximately equal to 17.2 (i.e., about 43% of a 40 hour work week, see Simagin
(sIMAGIN (1998))).
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The list of causes of decline pointed out in the literature is rather vast
6)
.
For the case of Russia, we can oer the following classication.
The rst group consists of events preceding or accompanying, the rst
stage of decline. First and foremost, those are:
 A collapse of the CMEA, the Warsaw Pact and the USSR. The break of
economic links between the CMEA countries, former Soviet republics
and regions of Russia.
 An abolition of the planning system.
 Price and foreign trade liberalization.
 A decrease in defense expenditures.
The second group concerns causes that may be unique to Russian rms.
Those are:
 A monopolistic structure of production.
 An inability of managers to operate in a market environment
7)
.
 A collectivist nature of relations within a rm and between rms.
The third group of causes concerns concrete policies pursued by the gov-
ernment during the decline. For example, Polterovich (pOLTEROWI^ (1996))
enumerates elements of the ination-resisting strategy of the government
which re-doubled the recession:
A rigid rationing of loans or the maintenance of high loan rates; delay
of payments from the budget, which produces a chain of non-payments;
an appreciation of the ruble (in real terms) which led to an increase in
imports and to a displacement of home-produced goods; the develop-
ment of a government bond market, which attracted circulating capital
for speculative operations; and the reduction of the state budget decit.
This group may include other causes pointed to by some authors as essential,
but that are, disputed by others (e.g., pOLTEROWI^ (1996)):
6)
The main references are Kornai (1993), Holzman et al. (1994), pOLTEROWI^ (1996),
Gomulka (1998).
7)
Insucient eort of the managers of rms of the old sector can be explained by
dierent causes: their secondary part-time employment; their greater interest in rent-
seeking than in productive activities; the general economic and political uncertainty; and
the lack of incentives in the presence of soft budget constraints.
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 A depreciation of industrial capacities because of the lack of capital
investment.
 An irrational tax system and excessive tax pressure.
Finally, the fourth group of causes concerns reactions of economic agents
to disturbances included in the rst and in the third groups and taking into
account the features of the second group. Thus, the causes included in the
fourth group result from other causes:
 A decrease of aggregate demand.
 A change of relative prices, particularly an increase in the ratio of the
prices of inputs to the prices of nal products.
 An institutional and structural reformation of the economy.
The last cause leads to disruptions in coordination when, as Kornai (1994)
describes it, \bureaucratic coordination no longer applies and market coor-
dination does not yet apply, and economic activity is impeded by disintegra-
tion, lack of coordination and anarchy." The mechanism of disorganization
was studied later by Blanchard and Kremer (1997).
The mainstream literature on the transformational recession is devoted to
compiling a precise and accurate list of causes and to selecting a subset of
the most important causes. Let us enumerate some of the proposed causal
mechanisms in a schematized form. Some directly attribute the output decline
to market liberalization.
1. The price liberalization leads to a change in relative prices. As a result,
production falls in some industries. Growth of production in \winner"
industries is limited because resources cannot be moved from one in-
dustry to another instantly.
2. The liberalization of prices and foreign trade leads to a relative increase
in prices of energy and raw materials. As a result, prots in other
industries decrease and production falls.
3. The price liberalization leads monopolists to increase prices and de-
crease output
8)
.
8)
The immediate consequences of the price liberalization can be seen in Benassy's (1986)
model of non-Walrasian equilibrium. We can show that in this model output decline cannot
result from the price liberalization in a competitive economy, but it can take place in a
monopolistic economy. In the latter case, a demonopolization after the price liberalization
does not lead to a growth of output. We leave detailed analysis for a separate paper.
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4. Considerable increases in nominal interest rates produce a shortage of
credit for rms and, consequently, an output decrease. The same cause
led to an increase in private savings and to a decrease in consumer
demand, resulting in a decrease in aggregate demand.
5. After the liberalization of the foreign trade, imported goods satised a
considerable part of consumer demand
9)
.
Some other mechanisms are more connected with the destruction of the
old organization structure.
6. Decreases in state subsidies and in government expenditures (particularly,
purchases of arms) lead to a decrease of output in many large enter-
prises, which spills over into other sectors by means of the multiplier
eect.
7. Transition has led to disorganization, and in particular to inecient de-
centralized bargaining between suppliers and buyers of inputs. Reduced
output at some point(s) of production chains led to an output fall along
whole chains.
8. For rms and their managers, rent-seeking activities become consider-
ably more protable than production.
In principle, any of these mechanisms or some combination of them could
give an initial push to the output decline. After that, other mechanisms could
have been activated. For instance, as production decreases, incomes and,
thus, aggregate demand fall. This, in turn, compounds the output decline.
Although the lists of factors of decline oered for various countries are
similar, the signicance which dierent authors attach to the separate causes
vary. As an example, we will review the wide range of opinions concerning the
relationship between of collapse of former trade links and the output decline.
Gomulka (1998) analyses the case of Poland, where price liberalization
took place in January 1990, and preceded by a year the collapse of the CMEA.
Both of these events were followed by 30% declines in industrial output.
Between the two, there was a 20% recovery. Taking into account the excessive
tightness of macroeconomic policy in the rst half of 1990, Gomulka ascribes
to the liberalization and stabilization policies 25 percentage points of the
40% cumulative fall, and 15 points to the collapse of CMEA trade. So, the
collapse of the CMEA, according to Gomulka, contributed signicantly to the
9)
We do not agree with those authors who connect this process with a shift in consumer
preferences. It rather should be attributed to changes in incomes and relative prices.
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fall of industrial output in Poland
10)
. According to Rodrik (1992), the collapse
of the CMEA explains the main part of the output decline in Hungary. On
the other hand, Polterovich (pOLTEROWI^ (1996)) completely excludes the
collapse of economic links between the countries of the CMEA, former Soviet
republics and regions of Russia from his list of main factors of the Russian
recession because \this reason could have an important inuence only at the
rst stage of reforms." This divergence of opinion can be explained by the
dierence in the duration of the decline in dierent countries. If in Poland
recovery started two years after the beginning of the recession, in Russia the
trough had not been reached even after seven years of decline.
This discussion suggests that the main causes of the decline in Poland
are connected with concrete events, which came in succession. This makes it
possible to ascribe to each of these events a specic share of the cumulative
decline. The case of Russia is somewhat dierent. Here, numerous factors
acted simultaneously over an extended period. In light of this, two related
questions arise. Do reliable methods for selecting the main factors of decline
exist? And do methods exist for ascertaining the relative importance of these
separate factors?
In order to partially answer these questions let us assume that there is a
relation
y = F (x
1
; x
2
; : : : ; x
n
);
where y is a magnitude dening the output level (it can be the output level
itself or its growth rate), and x
1
; : : : ; x
n
are some magnitudes inuencing y.
We will consider the function F on a set A = [0; a
1
) [0; a
2
)    [0; a
n
),
where a
1
; : : : ; a
n
are positive numbers. We will assume that the function F
is increasing and is continuously dierentiable. Let n causes of decline consist
in decreases in x
i
, i = 1; : : : ; n, respectively. In the case when
ln y = g
1
(x
1
) + g
2
(x
2
) +   + g
n
(x
n
);
or (what is the same)
y = f
1
(x
1
) f
2
(x
2
)   f
n
(x
n
);(1)
where g
i
; f
i
, i = 1; : : : ; n are increasing functions, and the elasticity of y with
10)
Gomulka cites a working paper by Czyzewski et al. (1995) attributing about 20%
of the fall to the collapse of the CMEA. On the other hand, according to Brada and
King (1992) the main factor explaining the decline in Poland is a decrease of autonomous
consumer demand. Severe demand shock (as in several other countries of Eastern Europe)
may be a result of unication of Germany and of dollarization of the CMEA trade (see
Raiser (1997)).
13
2. Transformational Decline: What Is Essential for Its Explanation?
respect to x
i
for each i is equal to
E
x
i
y =
@y
@x
i
x
i
y
= E
x
i
f
i
=
@f
i
@x
i
x
i
f
i
(x
i
)
and depends only on f
i
, x
i
for a given concrete index i
11)
. This means
that each of magnitudes x
i
inuences y independently. Moreover, each of
the causes of the decline, i, can be estimated separately (e.g., using the
elasticity E
x
i
y), and the dierent causes can be easily ordered according to
their contribution to the decline. Besides, it is not too important whether
the causes of decline act simultaneously, or in succession, and in what order.
In this case one can speak in an absolute sense about more or less important
causes of decline.
A dierent situation can emerge when the function F has a more complex
structure than in (1). In particular, in Section 3.6 a case appears where
@E
x
i
y
@x
j
> 0; E
x
i
y    !
x
j
!0
0; i 6= j; i; j = 1; : : : ; n:
This means that the role of each cause of decline decreases when other causes
act. If the causes of decline act in succession, then each of the emerged causes
weakens the inuence of all subsequent causes. If causes emerge randomly,
then any of them can be insignicant. If causes act simultaneously then with
a decline developing, all of them lose their inuence. However, if the causes
of decline act simultaneously and each of them is strong enough, then there
might be a case when an investigator ascribes the decline to the action of one
of the causes (or a subset of the causes) and calls all the others insignicant.
In this case the choice of the main cause becomes absolutely subjective
12)
.
Example. Let n = 2,
y = F (x
1
; x
2
) = f(x
1
) g(x
2
) + h(x
2
);
where f is an increasing function and h is a function which decreases on the
set [0;+1); g is increasing on the set [0; a), a < +1; f(0) = g(0) = 0;
11)
In particular, if f
i
(x
i
) = A
i
x

i
i
, then E
x
i
f
i
= 
i
.
12)
It can be compared with a situation when four big men tow a broken car. In this case
the eorts of any three of them are sucient for towing, but one cannot point to a man
whose eorts can be called inessential. In the literature one can nd the following reasoning
concerning the signicance of separate causes of decline: \The cause Z is called important
by author X for the explanation of the decline in country A but this cause evidently did
not act in the country B where nevertheless a considerable decline took place. Hence, the
cause Z is not essential for the decline in the country A." In the light of what was said
above, we cannot regard this reasoning as correct.
14
2. Transformational Decline: What Is Essential for Its Explanation?
h(0) = b > 0; h(x
2
)  !
x
2
!+1
0. Then
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1
) g(x
2
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1
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2
)]x
2
f(x
1
) g(x
2
) + h(x
2
)
;
and it follows that E
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y
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1
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2
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):
We will consider the function F on the set [0;+1) [0; a). Let the function
g(x
2
)=h(x
2
) be increasing. Then
@E
x
1
y
@x
2
> 0;
@E
x
2
y
@x
1
> 0:
This means that the inuence of each of the two causes of decline weakens
when the other cause acts. We will make use of these results in Section 3.6.
Several authors have studied dierent aspects of the transformational re-
cession, using a range of models and techniques. Movshovich (mOW[OWI^
(1992)) developed a non-Walrasian equilibrium model to explain the out-
put recession during the transition to a market economy. Calvo and Cori-
celli (1993) evaluated the role of restrictions on state subsidies and bank
loans. Polterovich (pOLTEROWI^ (1995)) showed that under conditions of
credit shortage additional credits can lead to an output decrease. Dewa-
tripont and Maskin (1995) showed that centralized credit distribution could
lead to an increase in the transactions cost per worker and to an output de-
cline. Matveenko (1995) considered a model with mutual externalities (such
as personal links between managers of dierent rms or between managers
and local and federal authorities) and showed how catastrophes, such as the
Tchernobyl accident, could lead to a change in the pattern of development.
Several authors used sector reallocation models to study the dynamics of
transition. Among them, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) considered agents'
incentives to block reforms; Aghion and Blanchard (1994) studied the eect
of unemployment benets and incomes policy; Dixit and Rob (1994) and
Atkeson and Kehoe (1996) studied the impact of social insurance on agents'
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incentives to move between sectors. Roland and Verdier (1997) proposed
a search model in which liberalization leads to a restructuring of pair links
between rms in which relation-specic investments are not made if agents
intend to search in the next period. Blanchard and Kremer (1997) studied
several mechanisms of disorganization. Atkeson and Kehoe (1997) simulated
the transition process in a model with rm-specic organizational capital and
showed that even in a perfect market economy it takes 5{7 years until output
and productivity begin to grow.
Since economists have already enumerated many causes for the output
collapse, one might ask whether there is any sense in considering additional
factors. We believe the answer is yes. In our work, we turn to often overlooked
features of the Russian economy that both played a role in initiating the
decline and continue to have a depressing eect. These features include
collectivist labor relations in the old sector and the presence of the shadow
economy. These two aspects of the Russian economy are considered in the
following two sections, respectively. Adding to the list of the mechanisms
that potentially caused the output collapse, we thus consider:
9. The wage dierential between the old and the new sectors (see Tables
2, 3) and the possibility of secondary employment lead to a decrease
in the factual employment in the old sector in comparison with the
ocially listed employment. The movement of a part of the labor force
to the new sector does not lead to a total output increase.
10. The rms seeking to evade taxes move their activity partially to the
unregistered shadow economy; as a result, the registered economy's
output decreases. The strengthening of supervisory bodies leads to a
decrease in unregistered output.
It should be noted that these mechanisms, including numbers 1{8, are
simplied; they give just the general intuition underlying the modeled mech-
anisms of decline.
3. MODEL OF LABORMARKETS, OUTPUT DECLINE
AND LABOR HOARDING
Let the old sector consist of M
1
similar rms, and the new one of M
2
similar
competitive rms.
16
3. Model of Labor Markets, Output Decline and Labor Hoarding
We make specic assumptions, concerning institutional and organizational
aspects of labor relations in the old sector
13)
:
1. Firms in the old sector do not prevent their workers from holding another
part-time job in the new sector if their ocially registered working time
is not completely expended.
2. Firms in the old sector do not require full eort fromworkers or complete
use of ocially registered working time. A rm requires that any of its
workers work not less than the others.
Agents in the model are workers (including managers) and rms in the
new and the old sectors. A worker can be either employed full-time in the new
sector or employed simultaneously both in the old sector (full-time formally,
and part-time actually) and in the new sector (part-time)
14)
.
Let us enumerate the basic notation:
L
0
is the ocially registered number of workers in a rm in the old sector;
W
0
is the ocial wage rate in the old sector;
L
f
is the factual spent labor in a rm in the old sector;
l
0
= 1 is the normalized value of working time of a worker in the old
sector;

l is the factual working time of the average worker in the old sector (i.e.,
L
f
=

lL
0
);
l
f
is the factual working time of the representative worker in the old
sector
15)
;
l
s
f
is the labor supply of the representative worker in the old sector;
l
2
is the working time of the representative worker in the new sector;
W
2
is the wage rate in the new sector;
N is the total number of workers in the country.
13)
Some authors point to special role played by collectivist relations in Russian economy
(e.g., pOLTEROWI^ (1996)), nevertheless, they do not investigate this role and do not
formalize the conception of collectivism.
14)
This assumption diers from what is adopted in the \all-or-nothing" models of the
search literature, in which in each time period the worker either works or searches for a
new job. See Atkeson and Kehoe (1996) for an example of the use of sectoral reallocation
search models to study the dynamics of transition. Our assumption reects the evidence
mentioned in Section 2. We leave it to future work the building of a model that combines
our ideas with ones from the search literature.
15)
Distinguishing representative and average agents is a usual device in equilibrium anal-
ysis (see e.g., Lucas (1988)).
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Using this notation, assumption 2 can be formalized in the following way:
the wage rate of the representative worker in the old sector is equal to
16)
w(l
f
;

l;W
0
) =

W
0
; if l
f


l;
0; if l
f
<

l:
(2)
We assume that the wage rates for full-time and part-time jobs in the new
sector coincide, so the part-time worker gains W
2
l
2
in the new sector
17)
.
3.1. WORKER
The worker maximizes utility, V (C   K(l)), V
0
> 0, V
00
< 0, K
0
> 0,
K
00
 0 where
C = w(l
f
;

l;W
0
) +W
2
l
2
l = l
f
+ l
2
:
The worker takes W
0
;W
2
and

l as exogenously given.
The problem is equivalent to
max
 
C  K(l)

;
where
C  K(l) =

W
0
+ l
2
W
2
 K(l
f
+ l
2
); if l
f


l;
l
2
W
2
 K(l
f
+ l
2
); if l
f
<

l.
We see that only the cases l
s
f
=

l and l
s
f
= 0 are compatible with maximiza-
tion. This means that the worker will either supply the same amount of labor
as an average one or that he will quit. Using the rst order condition and
16)
This assumption can be compared with Shapiro{Stiglitz (1984) model in which a
worker can be either l
f
= 0 (if the worker shirks) or l
f
= 1 (if the worker does not shirk).
In our case, shirking means supplying labor eort on a level lower than the average level
supplied by the workers of the rm. The workers themselves observe deviations from the
average, so there is no problem of imperfect monitoring such as in Shapiro{Stiglitz model.
If a worker is shirking he is always caught and red.
17)
It would be interesting and important to study models leading to more complex
relations between the time of work and wages. For example, it is reasonable to expect that
wage in the new sector is described by a logistic-type function w(l
2
), increasing rst slowly
and then faster until a satiation level is reached. In this case, multiple equilibria exist with
a low and with a high labor supply in the new sector. As far as the workers initially did
not supply labor in the new sector and are inclined only to a gradual redistribution of their
time, there will be no labor supply pressure in the new sector, and the wages rate there
can be rather high. We leave detailed analysis for another paper.
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introducing notation l

for the point where K
0
(l

) = W
2
, the problem turns
into
max

W
0
+ (l

 

l)W
2
 K(l

); l

W
2
 K(l

)
	
:
The rst term in the brackets corresponds to l
s
f
=

l, the second term to
l
s
f
= 0. In each of the cases, worker's supply of labor to the two sectors
equals l

.
This problem, in turn, is reduced to
maxfW
0
 

l W
2
; 0
	
:
It follows that
W
0
 

l W
2
> 0 implies l
s
f
=

l;
W
0
 

l W
2
< 0 implies l
s
f
= 0:
In the case of W
0
 

l W
2
= 0, the solution is ambiguous. Either l
s
f
=

l or
l
s
f
= 0. We assume that ceteris paribus the worker always prefers to have a
job in the old sector. This assumption can be explained by the presence of
certain social benets, which are only available there
18)
. So we assume l
s
f
=

l
for W
0
 

l W
2
= 0.
Finally, the worker's labor supply in the old sector is
l
s
f
=


l; if W
0
 W
2

l;
0; if W
0
< W
2

l:
(3)
Note that the wage rate in the new sector, W
2
, serves as a reservation
wage for the worker in the old sector. Equation (3) indicates that the worker
will work as much as others do if the reservation wage is not too high, but he
will not work in the old sector at all if the reservation wage is high enough.
Specication (2) seems to reect the institutional features of labor rela-
tions in the old sector accurately enough and solution (3) looks like the real
behavior of workers in Russia.
18)
Though the volume of these benets (such as provision of housing, food, lots of
land, kindergartens and camps, healthcare and health resorts, free transportation, etc.) is
diminishing an expectation of future benets remains. Also essential is a possibility of using
rms' resources to personal aims (e.g., drivers use trucks for additional earnings) which
seems to be larger in the old sector as compared with the new one.
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3.2. FIRM IN THE OLD SECTOR
We consider a rm in the old sector which maximizes prot, F
1
(L
f
) W
0
L
0
,
over W
0
and L
0
. The function F
1
is assumed to satisfy F
0
1
() > 0, F
00
1
() < 0,
F
1
(0) = 0. The rm takes W
2
as an exogenous parameter, however it can
indirectly determine

l.
Since, from (3),
F
1
(L
f
) W
0
L
0
=

F
1
(

lL
0
) W
0
L
0
; if W
0
 W
2

l;
 W
0
L
0
; if W
0
< W
2

l:
The rm will set W
0
such that W
0
= W
2

l
19)
. In so far as L
f
= l
f
L
0
=

lL
0
,
it follows that
20)
W
0
L
0
= W
2
L
f
:(4)
The rm's problem reduces to
max F
1

W
0
L
0
W
2

 W
0
L
0
:(5)
Note that the individual values of variables W
0
; L
0
are not as important as
their product, W
0
L
0
21)
.
19)
It follows under

l  1 that W
0
 W
2
. This explains why the ocial wages in the old
sector are not greater than in the new one (see Tables 3, 4).
20)
Equation (4) can be rewritten as L
f
= W
0
L
0
=W
2
. Under W
0
 W
2
, workers
in the old sector supply their labor elastically at a xed factual wage rate W
2
. Under
W
0
= W
2
, all the ocially registered labor L
0
is supplied. Under W
0
< W
2
, only a
fraction of the ocially registered labor is supplied. Involuntary unemployment can arise.
Involuntary means here that workers would like to work more in the old sector under
conditions of high payments (with rate W
2
for a unit of labor), but not with ocial rate
W
0
. This unemployment is distributed uniformly among ocially registered workers, and
this phenomenon can be called distributed unemployment.
21)
Optimization problem that requires maximization with respect to the product W
0
L
0
,
but lets the rm choose between W
0
and L
0
, reects the one actually faced by the Russian
rms weighing the tradeo between the ocial wage and ocially registered labor (see
also Raiser (1997)). We show that, in so far as W
0
< W
2
, this choice is not essential for
the determination of the factual employment, L
f
.
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The rst order condition is
22)
F
0
1

W
0
L
0
W
2

= W
2
:(6)
Given W
2
, this condition denes the factual employment, L
f
= W
0
L
0
=W
2
.
We have
L
f
= '
1
(W
2
);
where '
1
is the inverse function for the derivative F
0
1
.
Note that L
f
is a function of the reservation wage, W
2
, and does not
depend on the ocially registered wage, W
0
, nor the ocially registered
number of workers, L
0
.
The same result holds if the rm maximizes over either W
0
or L
0
given
the other.
Given a Cobb{Douglas production function, F
1
(L
f
) =  L

f
, the factual
employment is equal to
L
f
=


W
2

1=(1 )
:(7)
Since the old sector consists of M
1
identical rms, the total factual em-
ployment is equal to '
1
(W
2
)M
1
.
3.3. LABOR MARKET IN THE NEW SECTOR
The rm's problem in the new sector is
max F
2
(L
2
)  W
2
L
2
;
where F
2
is a production function, which is assumed to satisfy F
0
2
() > 0,
F
00
2
() < 0, F
2
(0) = 0.
The labor demand of the rm, L
d
2
, is dened by the rst order condition
F
0
2
(L
d
2
) = W
2
:
22)
The problem (5) can be considered from the viewpoint of the model of eciency
wages in which the rm maximizes F (e(W )L) WL; e(W ) is the eect function. There
are two rst order conditions. One of them, e(W )F
0
(e(W )L) = W , which means that
the marginal product of an additional worker is equal to the wage, corresponds to (6). The
other, e
0
(W )W=e(W ) = 1, means that the elasticity of eort with respect to the wage is
equal to one, always holds for our case. So, in contrast to the basic model of eciency
wages, our model does not imply rigidity of the ocially registered wage rate, W
0
.
21
3. Model of Labor Markets, Output Decline and Labor Hoarding
The total labor demand in the new sector is '
2
(W
2
) M
2
, where '
2
is the
inverse function for the derivative, F
0
2
.
Since N is the total number of workers in the country and M
1
is the
number of identical rms in the old sector, the total labor supply in the new
sector is equal to
l

(W
2
)N   '
1
(W
2
)M
1
:
The equilibrium in the new sector implies
'
1
(W
2
)M
1
+ '
2
(W
2
)M
2
= l

(W
2
)N;(8)
where the sectoral labor demand functions, '
1
and '
2
, are decreasing with
respect toW
2
, and the labor supply function, l

(W
2
), is increasing. Equation
(8) denes W
2
. The model gives possible explanations of two interconnected
phenomena, which are distinctive for the Russian economy: output recession
and labor hoarding.
3.4. OUTPUT RECESSION
With an increase in the reservation wage, W
2
, the factual employment in the
old sector, L
f
= '
1
(W
2
), and correspondingly the output of the old sectors
decrease.
We will point out several situations in which W
2
increases.
a) The number of the rms in the new sector, M
2
, increases (for example,
because of direct foreign investments). In such case, as (8) shows, W
2
also increases.
b) Technology in the new sector improves (for example, because of the
use of foreign know-how). Let us consider the case of F
2
= F
2
(L
2
; ),
where  corresponds to the state of technology, and the marginal prod-
uct of labor, @F
2
=@L
2
, increases in . Then '
2
= '
2
(W
2
; ) in-
creases in  as well (for instance, if F
2
= L

2
, then '
2
(W
2
; ) =
(=W
2
)
1=(1 )
). According to (8), an increase in  leads to an in-
crease in W
2
.
c) The labor force, N , decreases (for example, because of emigration or
because of a reduction of the rate of participation). This leads to an
increase in W
2
.
The total output in the economy is equal to
Y = F
1
 
'
1
(W
2
)

M
1
+ F
2
 
'
2
(W
2
)

M
2
:
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One can see clearly that under conditions of static technology and a constant
number of rms in the old and the new sectors, M
1
and M
2
, this entails
Y
0
(W
2
) = W
2

'
0
1
(W
2
)M
1
+ '
0
2
(W
2
)M
2

< 0:
Thus, output decreases with any increase in reservation wage, W
2
. In partic-
ular, output contracts if the labor force, N , decreases.
An improvement in the technology in the new sector by itself leads to
an increase of the total output in the economy in spite of the fact that the
reservation wage, W
2
, increases and the output in the old sector falls. In
fact, assuming (b) and expressing '
1
(W
2
) from (8) we receive that the total
output in the equilibrium is equal to
Y = F
1

l

(W
2
)N   '
2
(W
2
; )M
2
M
1

M
1
+ F
2
 
'
2
(W
2
); 

M
2
:
Then
dY
d
= F
0
1

l
0
@W
2
@
N '
0
2
@W
2
@
M
2
 
@'
2
@
M
2

+F
0
2

'
0
2
@W
2
@
+
@'
2
@

M
2
:
Taking into account that F
0
1
= F
0
2
= W
2
in the equilibrium, we receive
dY
d
= W
2
l
0
@W
2
@
N > 0:
For more complex cases we can nd conditions under which a decline takes
place. Let the economy at the initial equilibrium be described by parameters
M
1
;M
2
; N;W
2
; l

, which satisfy equation (8). Assume, for example, that
the number of new rms, M
2
, increases and the number of old rms, M
1
,
and the labor force, N , stay unchanged. In this case, W
2
increases as was
already mentioned. It follows from the equation for the total output that
@Y
@M
2
= F
0
1
'
0
1
@W
2
@M
2
M
1
+ F
0
2
'
0
2
@W
2
@M
2
M
2
+ F
2
 
'
2
(W
2
)

= W
2
('
0
1
M
1
+ '
0
2
M
2
)
@W
2
@M
2
+ F
2
 
'
2
(W
2
)

:
Equation (8) implies that
'
0
1
M
1
+ '
0
2
M
2
+ '
2
(W
2
)
@M
2
@W
2
= l
0
(W
2
)N:
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Hence the following inequality is necessary and sucient for a decline:
W
2
l
0
(W
2
)N
@W
2
@M
2
 W
2
'
2
(W
2
) + F
2
 
'
2
(W
2
)

< 0:
This implies that in the case under consideration a decline is possible only if
the new sector is not protable:
F
2
(L
d
2
)  W
2
L
d
2
< 0:
We discuss this result in Subsection 3.7.
3.5. LABOR HOARDING
Using the Cobb{Douglas function, F
1
= L

f
, we consider the case when
rms in the old sector take the ocially registered real wage rate, W
0
, as
an exogenous parameter
23)
. Given W
0
, the rm chooses an ocial level of
employment, L
0
. The solution is
L
0
= ()
1=(1 )
W
 1
0
W
=( 1)
2
:(9)
We can see that ifW
0
andW
2
change over time in such a way thatW
0
W
=(1 )
2
does not increase, then ocially registered employment, L
0
, does not de-
crease. Thus, labor hoarding can emerge either from a decrease of both,
W
0
and W
2
(the ocial real wage rate in the old sector and the real wage
rate in the new one), or from an increase in W
2
, compensated by a sucient
decrease in W
0
.
If W
2
increases but W
0
remains constant then, as one can see from (7),
(9), both the factual employment in the old sector, L
f
, and the ocial
employment, L
0
, decrease but L
f
reacts more intensively than L
0
does.
3.6. AN IMPLICATION OF THE MODEL:
RECESSION PATTERNS IN THE OLD SECTOR
A commonly held view is that only the new sector can generate growth (see,
e.g., Kornai (1994); Ruhl and Vinogradov (1996); Swaan (1996)). However,
the very size of the old sector and the slow speed of restructuring formally
privatized big enterprises make it reasonable to consider a model of economic
23)
This assumption reects the presence of rigid wage rates or labor agreements that
dene a wage in the majority of enterprises in the old sector.
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growth/recession on its basis alone. We consider such a model in this sub-
section. This model combines a standard approach from growth theory with
the implications of the model studied previously in this section.
The output of the economy in period t,
Y
t
= rF (K
t
; L
t
f
);
is dened by capital, K
t
, and the factual employment, L
t
f
. The production
function possesses constant returns to scale and other standard neoclassical
properties. Here, r is an exogenous parameter of the \state of technology".
As we have seen, total real wages are equal to
w
t
= L
t
0
W
t
0
= L
t
f
W
t
f
:
where W
t
f
is the factual wage rate. The results of previous subsections imply
that W
t
f
is equal to the wage rate in the new sector, W
t
2
, which can be
considered by the old sector as an exogenous variable.
Other equations dening the model describe output distribution,
Y
t
= w
t+1
+ I
t+1
;
and capital formation,
K
t+1
= K
t
+ I
t+1
:
Here I
t
is investment; (1  ) is a depreciation coecient, 0 <  < 1.
Let us introduce a variable V = w=K
24)
. The production function can
thus be represented as
rF (K; L
f
) = KrF

1;
L
f
K

= KrF

1;
w
KW
f

= KrF

1;
V
W
2

= KrF (V ):
The function f is strictly concave and increasing, it depends on parameter
W
2
; f(0) = 0. We assume that f
0
(0) =1 and f
0
(V )! 0 as V !1.
Equations describing the model imply that
K
t+1
=
 + rf(V
t
)
1 + V
t+1
K
t
;(10)
Y
t+1
= K
t+1
rf(V
t+1
):(11)
24)
We can think about the economy as consisting of K identical rms or workshops with
unit capital stocks. Then V represents the total wages, W
0
L
0
, chosen by a single rm.
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It is natural to call the pair (K
t
; Y
t
) a state of the model in period t;
and the sequence (K
0
; Y
0
); (K
1
; Y
1
); : : : a trajectory. We will say that a
trajectory has growth factor  starting from period

t if
K
t+1
= K
t
; Y
t+1
= Y
t
; t 

t:
Let us x some value of V such that
rf(V )  V:(12)
Lemma 3.1. Let an initial state (K
0
; Y
0
) be such that
Y
0
 K
0
V;(13)
and let V
t
= V; t = 1; 2; : : : . Then
K
t+1
= (V )K
t
; Y
t+1
= (V )Y
t
; t = 1; 2; : : :;
where
(V ) =
 + rf(V )
1 + V
;(14)
i.e., the trajectory has the growth factor (V ) starting from period 1.
Proof. It follows from (10) and (11) that
K
1
=
K
0
+ Y
0
1 + V
; Y
1
= K
1
rf(V );
K
2
=
 + rf(V )
1 + V
K
1
= (V )K
1
; Y
2
= K
2
rf(V ) = (V )Y
1
;
K
t+1
= (V )K
t
; Y
t+1
= (V )Y
t
; t  2:
QED
The growth factor (V ) dened by (14) is a function of V depending
on parameters r and W
2
. Its schedule is presented in Figure 2; (0) = ,
(V )  ! 0, V !1.
The schedule (V ) shifts up when r increases, or when W
2
decreases.
Conversely, it moves down if r decreases, or if W
2
increases.
Let initially r be high enough and W
2
be low enough to provide for a
positive growth rate, (V )   1, for an initially accepted value of V . Let V
be not too high, so that the inequality 
0
(V ) > 0 holds.
We can suppose that liberalization has led to one or more of the following
changes:
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1. The coecient r has decreased (perhaps a result of changes in relative
prices | see Section 2).
2. The reservation wage, W
2
, has increased (due to the emergence and
development of the new sector | see Subsection 3.4).
3. The value V = W
0
L
0
=K decreased as a result of an increase in W
2
(see Subsection 3.2).
Figure 2.
Each of these changes leads to a decrease in the growth factor, (V ). It
is important to notice that the growth rate, (V )   1, can change its sign.
If at least one of the changes 1{3 is strong enough, the growth factor, (V ),
becomes less than one and the growth rate, (V )  1, becomes negative.
The model shows also what changes lead to a recovery of growth. They
include:
1. An increase in the coecient r, which can result from technological
improvements or a decline in the prices of some inputs
25)
.
25)
For example, recently the government reached an arrangement with railways concern-
ing a reduction of freight prices.
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2. A decrease in the real wage rate in the new sector, W
2
, which might
result from managerial improvements in privatized former state rms.
At the end of this subsection, we turn to the problem of estimating the
signicance of dierent factors of decline. We see that the growth factor,
(V ) = ( + rf(V ))=(1 + V ), resulting from our model, increases with
respect to r. Besides, (V ) reaches a maximum at some point V
1
and
increases in [0; V
1
). We will assume that r  0, V 2 [0; V
1
), One can point
out two groups of factors leading to a decrease in the growth factor. The rst
group includes factors leading to a decrease of the value of r (e.g., changes
in relative prices or technological shocks); the second group includes factors
leading to a decrease in V (e.g., changes in the real reservation wage, W
2
).
Rewriting the growth factor as
(V ) = r
f(V )
1 + V
+

1 + V
;
we can check that the conditions of the example from Section 2 are fullled.
The results obtained there imply that either of these two groups of causes
can be labeled inessential if the other group of causes is strong enough.
3.7. DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL AND ITS RESULTS
In this section, we have considered an equilibrium model with utility-maximiz-
ing workers (including managers) and with free movement of labor between
sectors. Unlike many other models we allow workers to be employed in both
sectors simultaneously. An important feature of the model is the consideration
given to collectivist labor relations in the old sector.
A detailed description of the old sector in our model allows to draw a
distinction between the ocially registered and the factual values of both
the level of employment and the wage rate. This allows us to clarify the
observed combination of a considerable output decline and a high registered
employment.
It was assumed here that rms are prot maximizing, both in the old and
in the new sectors. This assumption is made for the purpose of simplication,
to make the structure of the model and its results more transparent. Although
the question about the aims of Russian rms in the transition economy is not
studied suciently, it seems to us that the use of a wider class of objective
functions would not lead to a serious change in the results.
The functioning of the model corresponds to the tenth mechanism of
decline formulated at the end of Section 2. Among the basic results of the
model are the following.
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1. In equilibrium the factual real wage rate in the old sector is equal to
the real wage rate in the new one. The latter acts as a reservation wage for
the workers in the old sector.
2. The labor market equilibrium in the new sector entails the equilibrium
in the whole economy (see equation (8)).
3. Typical transitional changes (such as direct foreign investments, the
application of foreign know-how, emigration, and a decrease in the labor
force participation rate) lead to an increase in the reservation wage; this, in
turn, leads to a partial shift of labor from the old sector to the new one.
4. In some cases the total output decreases. If, for example, in the absence
of other changes, the labor force decreases, or if the number of new rms
increases but those rms are unprotable. The non-protability of the new
sector as a whole in Russia seems to be very likely. Many enterprises in the new
sector aim only at providing for the current well being of their owners/workers.
Another fraction of rms operates in an extremely unfavorable environment.
It is signicant that of the 130 thousand enterprises presently registered in
St.Petersburg, 40 thousand do not show any signs of life (Ritmy goroda,
1998,  2, February).
5. Technological changes in the new sector (with a production function
F
2
= L

2
) increase the total output despite the output in the old sector falls.
6. Labor hoarding in the old sector can emerge from an increase in the
reservation wage, W
2
, compensated by a sucient decrease in the real, o-
cially registered wage, W
0
.
In Subsection 3.6 we considered a dynamic model of the old sector where
the reservation wage, W
f
, was a parameter. We justify the focus on the
old sector with reference to its large capital stock and to the fact that large
enterprises in Russia are not being liquidated despite their dicult position.
The development of large rms that belonged to the old sector (for example,
enterprises in the defense industry) is one of the ways for Russia to develop.
We do not agree with those authors who believe the abolition of the old sector
to be axiomatic for Russian growth.
The model in Subsection 3.6 diers from traditional growth models in
which steady state trajectories do not dier from long-run growth rates, and
the maximum level of output is achieved provided a minimum wage rate.
Despite the opinion of some Western authors, the wage in post-Stalin Russia
was not xed at the living level, and an especially sharp increase in wages has
been observed after 1987 (see Figure 3).
In the 1960s, capital productivity began to decline, the reasons for which
were mysterious for Soviet economists. Using our model, we can explain
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the changes taking place up to 1987 by slow growth of the parameter W
f
, a
result of an increase in the requirements placed upon workers in the old sector.
Since 1987 the changes can be explained by a growth of W
f
resulting from
the emergence and development of the new sector (so-called \cooperatives").
Since that moment the parameter W
f
= W
2
has become a reservation wage
in the strict sense of the word. The model allows dierent growth rates
depending on the value of parameter W
f
.
Figure 3. Average wage rates in Russia. (Source: Peterburgskii Tchas Pik, 1998,
14 January.)
An important result of the model is the possibility of a change in the
pattern of development that occurs with an increase in W
f
. This implies that
a decline can be a natural trend path of the economy. The model suggests
that the trend can be reversed, and the economy returned to a growth pattern
by a relative decline of a worker's reservation wage (i. e., the wage in the new
sector).
4. THE ROLE OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY
IN THE OUTPUT RECESSION
In Subsection 4.1, we dene the shadow economy and describe the causes of
its rise and the features that distinguish it from regular forms of economic
activity. In Subsection 4.2, we discuss potential relationships between the
shadow economy and the output decline. In Subsection 4.3, we formally
outline a model of the economy with the shadow sector. In Subsection 4.4,
an analytical study is undertaken for the model and for a dynamic system
generated by a corresponding system of non-linear dierence equations. In
Subsection 4.5, some numerical examples are presented. In Subsection 4.6,
we present some policy-oriented conclusions.
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4.1. THE STRUCTURE OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY:
WHAT IS THE PLACE OF THE SHADOW SECTOR?
There are two views on the shadow economy in Russia. First, it can be
considered as an independent sector separated from the regular economy and
including only irregular forms of activity and, as a consequence, having its
own production function. Grossman (1977) dened the shadow economy in
the USSR as that production and exchange, which is undertaken for private
gain and/or is in violation of existing laws. So far as the regular economy was
socialist and could not serve private interests, both these properties dened
the rst type of shadow economy. In a paper by Welish and Findlay (1986),
two sectors are considered: the state sector, which produces products of heavy
and light industries; and the shadow sector, which produces only products of
light industry. They use this framework to compare equilibria in the planned
economy (when the government takes or does not take the shadow sector
into consideration) with the equilibrium in the competitive economy. Stahl
and Alexeev (1985) and Polterovich (1993) considered a particular form of
activity of the shadow economy, the \black" market, i. e. the resale of goods
produced by the state sector. A similar approach was accepted by Lipton and
Sachs (1990).
Some researchers have considered the existence of a shadow economy in
developed countries. Ginsburgh et al. (1985), for example, treat the shadow
economy as a separate sector with its own production function. A fraction
of the entire labor force is employed in this sector but employment in it is
not ocially registered. Ginsburgh et al. studied the dierences between
the ocially registered state of the economy and the true state and showed
that governmental policies produced dierent results depending upon the
relationship between the two sectors.
The other viewpoint on the shadow economy is based on the idea that
the shadow economy represents not an independent sector of economy, but
unregistered activities of the same agents who act also in the registered part
of the economy. If, following Dallago (1994), one refers to the economic
agents' activity which is not subject to the regular rules and laws or which is
somehow hidden from the supervisory bodies, as irregular activity, then one
can say that the shadow economy represents the irregular sector of economy.
The causes for the emergence of the irregular sector have been studied
in a broad context (see Hart (1987); Dallago (1994)). Generally, they are
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attributed to the avoidance of government imposed policies
26)
.
The shadow sector, in various degrees, exists in all countries regardless
of their level of development and whether or not they are plan or market
oriented. During the transition period, the irregular activity is compounded by
the lack of adequate institutions and rules. The labor supply on the irregular
market and tax evasion are the most popular forms of irregular activity. The
transition is accompanied by changes in institutions and rules, in structure of
consumption and production, imports and exports, and price liberalization.
These changes enable irregular activity to ourish.
Dallago (1994) argues that the irregular sector aects an economy's in-
stitutions, its future structure as well as its growth and development path,
especially during the period of transition.
Measuring the irregular economy, estimating its size and inuence on the
whole economy, is important for assessing the impact of policy decisions.
But there is little consensus among researchers as to how this should be
done. Pyle (1989) reviews the various approaches that have been used and
estimates that have been made. The results vary widely. For example, the
size of the shadow sector in the USA was estimated in the mid-to-late 1970s
to be as small as 3,6% of GNP and as large as 33% of GNP.
The irregular sector inuences almost all aspects of the economy, from the
level of unemployment to foreign capital investments. Polterovich (pOLTEROWI^
(1996)) cites the capital ight that is connected to the shadow economy as
among the factors contributing to the decline. Glaziev (gLAZXEW (1995))
refers to \criminalization of the economic relations because of the imperfec-
tion of legal system to solve economic problems and the huge size of the
shadow economy" as an important cause of economic depression.
4.2. THE PRESENCE OF THE SHADOW SECTOR
AS A CAUSE OF THE DECLINE
The decline in Russia was accompanied by a shift of production from the
registered sphere to the unregistered one as burdensome tax and regulatory
policies made conditions of functioning in the shadow sector more protable.
This process not only accompanies the production fall but also becomes one
26)
Here we can cite a recent message of the President to the Federal Assembly: \Today
in Russia the degree of risk to be made answerable for is not comparable with the prot
obtained from criminal activities. The problem of economic crimes and corruption in Russia
became not just police, as it is in the majority of countries, but political as well."
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of its causes. Recalling the 11th mechanism of decline (Section 2), one can
separate it into two components: (1) a decrease in the registered output
because of a shift of a part of production to the shadow sector, (2) the shift
itself, leads to a further decline in the remaining ocial part.
The assumption that the rm can decide which part of its output to
declare seems to reect the existing situation. The decision depends on the
tax policy and on the enforceability of the laws.
We tried to construct a model that mirrors Russia's reality based upon
our interpretation of statistical data, other literature and informal interviews
with managers from dierent St.Petersburg and Moscow rms. This evidence
suggested that the labor productivity of \gray" rms is approximately equal
to that in the ocial sector, and that the decision about which sector to
operate in is sensitive to tax policies.
4.3. MODEL WITH THE SHADOW OUTPUT
The representative rm decides which part of its output to declare (and,
hence, on which to pay its tax obligations), and which part to hide from
taxation. Concealment of some fraction of output incurs costs (e. g., bribes)
which will depend on the amount of hidden output and on the current policies
of state tax authorities. The latter would be a function of the resources
available to the state and the organizational and human capital of the tax
collectors. These state resources will be dened as some aggregate value,
H
t
, which will be assumed to depreciate like physical and human capital in
standard growth models. It can be replenished by investing a part of the taxes
collected.
Let y
t
be the whole output of the economy in period t;
z
t
1
is the declared output;
z
t
2
is the undeclared (shadow) output;
y
t
= z
t
1
+ z
t
2
;
H
t
is a magnitude reecting the state of taxation authorities in moment t;
H
t+1
= H
t
+ z
t
1
0    1 is the depreciation coecient for the state of taxation author-
ities;
0    1 is the coecient of investment to the state of taxation author-
ities from the declared output;
0  (1   )  1 is the tax rate;
z
t
1
is the rm's after-tax income from the declared output;
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g(z
t
2
;H
t
) is the rm's income from the undeclared output.
It is assumed that the function g increases in z
t
2
and decreases in H
t
, and
also has the following properties:
@g
@z
t
2
(0;H
t
) = 1; 8H
t
;
@
2
g(z
t
2
;H
t
)
@(z
t
2
)
2
< 0:(15)
The whole income of the rm in period t is equal to
Z
t
= z
t
1
+ g(z
t
2
;H
t
):
This income denes output in the next period: y
t+1
= F (Z
t
).
The rm solves the income maximization problem:
max z
t
1
+ g(z
t
2
;H
t
);(16)
subject to
z
t
1
+ z
t
2
= y
t
; z
t
1
 0; z
t
2
 0:
In the next subsection, we study the solution of this problem in a particular
case, with a certain form of functions g(z
t
2
;H
t
) and F (Z
t
).
The non-negativity restrictions on output are natural if by \output" we
mean a real amount of goods produced. However, if we consider z
t
1
and z
t
2
as ow variables equal to outputs in money terms, they can be negative. The
negative value of output in one sector can be interpreted as a loan made to
the other sector. Without the non-negativity constraints the rm's problem
is:
max z
t
1
+ g(z
t
2
;H
t
);(17)
subject to
z
t
1
+ z
t
2
= y
t
:
The problem (17) is equivalent to the problem with one variable:
max  (y
t
  z
t
2
) + g(z
t
2
;H
t
);(18)
4.4. SOLUTIONS OF MAXIMIZATION PROBLEMS
Let us consider a function that satises (15) and has the following form:
g(z
t
2
;H
t
) = z
t
2
  (z
t
2
)
2
H
t
:
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Let the sequence H
t
be bounded below by some number h > 0. Then the
sequence g(z
t
2
;H
t
) is bounded above. Also we are assuming that F (Z
t
) =
Z
t
,  > 1. In this case the following is a solution to the rm's maximization
problem (17):
z
t
2
=
1  
2H
t
; z
t
1
= y
t
  z
t
2
:
It is easy to see that under the condition
y
t
H
t
< (1   )=2:(19)
i. e. when y
t
and H
t
are relatively small, z
t
1
< 0; hence, problem (16) will
have a corner solution: z
t
1
= 0, z
t
2
= y
t
. That is, under initial conditions
satisfying inequality (19) only the shadow economy will work, and produce
all the output in the economy.
On the other hand, from the expression for z
t
2
one can see that z
2
! 0
under H
t
!1 Thus, the time could come when the shadow economy almost
disappears and all the output is produced by the ocial sector.
Notice a dierence between the solutions for problems (16) and (17). If in
problem (16) in some period either z
i
1
= 0 or z
i
2
= 0, then for any t = i+ k,
k = 1; 2; : : : , z
t
1
= 0 or z
t
2
= 0, respectively. Thus, for problem (16) there
are cases in which the ocial sector shuts down but the unlimited growth of
the shadow sector (and, consequently, of aggregate output) is possible.
Under any initial conditions, trajectories exist in which there is a decline
in the whole economy but a growth in some separate sector. The examples
of such trajectories are given in the numerical studies in Subsection 4.5.
If initially both the ocial and the shadow activities are present (i. e. z
0
1
>
0, z
0
2
> 0), then dierent patterns of economic development are possible. The
paths taken depend upon the values of the parameters: the rate of assignment
for the needs of the taxation authorities, ; the depreciation coecient for the
state of taxation authorities, 1 ; the coecient of the production function,
; the tax rate 1  . But if the inuence of the former two parameters seems
to be monotonic and quite predictable then the latter two parameters present
some \degrees of freedom"; these parameters inuence the qualitative picture
of the dynamics of the whole economy. We will try to discover the conditions
on these parameters that produce dierent patterns of development.
Under the form of the production function under consideration, F (Z
t
),
and the rm's income function of income in the shadow sector, g(z
t
2
;H
t
), for
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problem (17) the following non-linear dynamic system is obtained:
8
<
:
y
t+1
= y
t
+
(1 )
2
4H
t
H
t+1
= H
t
+ 

y
t
 
1 
2H
t

:
(20)
The steady state is described by the equations:
(
y = y +
(1 )
2
4H
H = H + 

y  
1 
2H

:
(21)
Solving this system with respect to y and H and taking into account all
the restrictions on the parameters, one can obtain the necessary and sucient
conditions for the existence of the steady state:
 < 1; (1 +  ) > 2
or
2

  1 <  <
1

:(22)
Thus, if the conditions specied in (22) hold then the steady state exists
and can be deduced from the system in (21). The conditions in (22) imply
that the tax rate, 1   , lies within the interval (1   1=, 2(1  1=)).
Let us now investigate the stability of the steady state using the stan-
dard methods for studying non-linear dynamic systems (see, e. g., Azariadis
(1993)). The Jacobian of the system in (20) is:
J(y;H) =
 

 (1 )
2
4H
2
 +
(1 )
2H
2
!
(23)
The characteristic polynomial is p() = 
2
  T+D, where T = 
1
+ 
2
=
 + + 0:5 (1   )=H
2
is the trace, and D = 
1

2
= + 0:25(1 

2
)=H
2
is the determinant of the matrix (23). It is easy to see that T > 0,
D > 0. The type of steady state depends upon the relation between the
values T , D (see Figure 4). The quadrant is divided into ve regions by the
lines T
2
  4D = 0, p(1) = 0 and D = 1. We have the following cases.
Region 1: The eigenvalues are real and lay on dierent sides of the unit;
the steady state is a saddle point.
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Region 2: The eigenvalues exceed 1; the steady state is a source and it is
unstable; trajectories are monotonic.
Region 3: The eigenvalues are complex, their absolute values exceed 1;
the steady state is unstable and oscillations of trajectories take place.
Region 4: The eigenvalues in absolute value terms are less than 1. Oscil-
lations take place but the steady state is asymptotically stable.
Region 5: The eigenvalues have the same sign and are less than 1 in
absolute value; trajectories are monotonic; the steady state is asymptotically
stable.
Figure 4.
Thus, taking into account the conditions for the existence of the steady
state, one can nd the conditions for its asymptotic stability: when the couple
(T;D) is in the shaded regions 4, 5 (see Figure 4) which is described by the
inequalities T < D + 1, D < 1. It follows that
H
2
> max

(1  
2
)
4(1  )
;
(1   )(2     )
4(1  )(1   )

:(24)
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The conditions for problem (16) somewhat dier from the conditions for
problem (17). For example, if H
0
does not satisfy condition (24), then on
some iteration i we obtain the corner solution H
i
= 0, z
i+k
2
= 0. So in the
case of problem (16) the development of the economy can stop without reach-
ing the steady state of problem (17). The solution to problem (17) may ap-
proach (but maybe not asymptotically) the steady state or can stay in a cycle.
4.5. NUMERICAL STUDY AND THE STEADY STATE
PARAMETERS
Recall that the parameters of the model are: 0    1, the depreciation
coecient for the state of taxation authorities; 0    1, the coecient of
investments to the taxation authorities from the declared output; 0    1,
the after tax share of the income from the declared activity;  > 0, the
coecient of the production function. The quantities  and  are regarded as
invariable because they represent some properties of the taxation authorities
and the growth potential of the economy, respectively. But  and  can
be regarded as control parameters. Experiments show that the model is not
sensitive to small variations of  (compare Figures 6 and 9). Thus, the study
of the sensitivity to variations of  is of the most interest.
Let  = 0.1,  = 0.05,  = 
0
,  = 1.2. It was shown before that there
exist values of  delimiting the regions of the existence and stability of the
steady state. Indeed, the trajectories not satisfying conditions (22) do not
lead to the steady state (see Figure 8); the trajectories in some neighborhood
of the bound of the interval, given by (22), are also unstable.
There exists a value 
0
, which is a frontier between decline and growth
patterns. In our example 
0
= 0.8; under the values of parameter less than
0.8, one can observe decline, and under the values greater than 0.8, one
observes growth; under 
0
= 0.8 the economy is in the steady state.
In Figures 5, 6, and 7 examples are shown under the values of 
0
within
the interval of stability. We can see in Figure 7 that the outputs of the shadow
and ocial sectors have perpetual
27)
oscillations near the steady state. In
this case, the economy is in a dynamic equilibrium.
27)
Indeed these uctuations are not perpetual. Here we can face the problem of chaos
in non-linear dynamical systems (see, for example, Zaslavsky G.M., Sagdeev R. Z. Weak
Chaos and Quasiregular Structures. Moscow, Nauka, 1991 (in Russian)). But in this
model, we consider the short-run and can be rather satised by the rst 100{200 steps of
the solution.
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Figure 5a.
Figure 5b.
Figure 5c.
Parameters:  = 0.8; for t = 0: z
1
= 2, z
2
= 1, y = 3, H = 0.1;
for t = 1: z
1
= 2.065909, z
2
= 0.909091, y = 2.975,H = 0.11 ( = 1.19).
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Figure 6a.
Figure 6b.
Figure 6c.
Parameters:  = 0.781; for t = 0: z
1
= 1.905, z
2
= 1.095, y = 3, H = 0.1; for t = 1:
z
1
= 1.915103, z
2
= 1.04038, y = 2.955483, H = 0.10525 ( = 1.2).
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Figure 7a.
Figure 7b.
Figure 7c.
Parameters:  = 0.78; for t = 0: z
1
= 1.9, z
2
= 1.1, y = 3, H = 0.1; for t = 1:
z
1
= 1.905581, z
2
= 1.047619, y = 2.9532, H = 0.105 ( = 1.2).
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Figure 8a.
Figure 8b.
Figure 8c.
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Figure 8d.
Parameters:  = 0.9; for t = 0: z
1
= 2.5, z
2
= 0.5, y = 3, H = 0.1;
for t = 1: z
1
= 2.9, z
2
= 0.37, y = 3.27, H = 0.135 ( = 1.2).
Figure 9a.
Figure 9b.
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Figure 9c.
Figure 9d.
Parameters:  = 0.781,  = 1; for t = 0: z
1
= 1.905, z
2
= 1.095, y = 3, H = 0.1; for
t = 1: z
1
= 2.898303, z
2
= 0.05718, y = 2.955483, H = 1.915 ( = 1.2).
Figure 10a.
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Figure 10b.
Figure 10c.
Figure 10d.
Parameters:  = 0.73; for t = 0: z
1
= 1.65, z
2
= 1.35, y = 3, H = 0.1; for t = 1:
z
1
= 1.387, z
2
= 1.459, y = 2.847, H = 0.093 ( = 1.2).
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Figure 11a.
Figure 11b.
Figure 11c.
Parameters:  = 0.83; for t = 0: z
1
= 2.15, z
2
= 0.85, y = 3, H = 0.1; for t = 1:
z
1
= 2.351, z
2
= 0.723, y = 3.075, H = 0.118 ( = 1.2).
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Figure 11d.
In Figures 5 and 6 a slow oscillating convergence to the steady state is
shown corresponding to regions 4 and 5 in Figure 4.
In Figures 6, 7 and 9 one can observe a decline in the whole economy:
a temporary (cyclical) decline in Figures 6 and 7 and a perpetual decline in
Figure 9.
In Figures 10 and 11, the cases are shown when decline and growth in the
economy take place.
4.6. ESTIMATING PARAMETER VALUES
As shown in the previous subsection, output either decreases or grows or stays
in the steady state depending upon parameter values. In this subsection we
try to estimate the parameters using real data.
One can compute the tax rate (1    ) and the parameter  (which is
the share of declared output invested to maintain the taxation authorities)
using the Budget of Russia. Tax rate (1    ) is equal to 0.58, i.E. 58%,
thus,  = 0.42. We used a method from the paper of Egorova and Petrov
(eGOROWA I pETROW (1996)) to make this calculation. If it is assumed that
 = n(1  ), where n is the share of expenses for taxation authorities in total
budgetary charges, then  = 0.012, and the annual investment in taxation
authorities amounts to 1.2% of ocial output.
The parameter  was estimated from the model using equations in Sub-
section 4.4 and assuming that
z
t
2
= iy
t
;(25)
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 =
y
t+1
y
t
2
2 + i(1   )
(26)
We use two alternative sources for an estimate of  because of inconsisten-
cies in statistics concerning the shadow economy. According to Goskomstat,
the growth was 0.4% and the share of the shadow economy in GDP comes to
25% in 1997. Given these data, equation (26) yields  = 2.039. According
to the EBRD (1997), who refer to Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997),
in 1994 and 1995
28)
the share of the unocial economy was estimated at
40.3%, and 41.6% of total GDP, respectively, and growth in 1995 was  4%.
Given these data, equation (26) yields  = 1:403. The average of these two
values is  = 1:904.
From equation (22), it is possible to compute the interval of the steady
state values for : 1.408 <  < 2.381. Both the estimated values (and their
average) belong to this interval, hence the steady state exists.
Figure 12
29)
shows the typical behavior of the economy with the estimated
parameters. Here we see a fall in ocial output, growth of the shadow sector
and decline in aggregate output. With other values of H
0
and , the picture
remains almost the same, but in some cases we see growth in the very short
run. This growth, however, may be caused by the local unstability of the
solution and it is not higher than 0.5% per period.
Thus, with such parameter values, economic growth is impossible even if
the shadow sector increases. Growth will only occur if there is an increase in
values of  and . The inuence of parameter  seems to be negligible. If it
decreases, the shadow sector decreases, but the ocial one decreases as well.
The parameter  cannot be changed in the short run, but in the long run it
can be improved by productive investments in physical and human capital.
For growth with other parameters unchanged, it is necessary that  = 2.37.
In this case, the growth rate will be under 0.6% per a period. Thus, in
order to have growth with a xed tax rate, the eciency of the economy
must increase by almost 20%. Therefore, this tax rate is rather high for
28)
The choice of years is due to the presence/absence of data. In 1994{1995, Goskomstat
does not take into account the shadow economy, and Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer
(1997) do not include data for 1996{1997.
29)
To dene H
0
and  with eligible degree of accuracy seems to be impossible. Because
of this fact, a relationship between the ocial sector and the shadow one in the model may
not exist, but the dynamics of the size of this sectors seems to be quite realistic since it
does not depend on the values of these parameters.
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a transition economy, with its obsolete equipment, scarcity of investment,
rent-seeking behavior, etc. A reduction in the tax rate would appear to be
a necessary prerequisite for growth. But what should be the value of the
tax rate for the growth to start under the existing productivity level of the
economy? The model suggests that with other parameters unchanged, the
tax rate should not exceed 0.49 if growth is to occur. This case is shown in
Figure 13; the parameters do not belong to the interval of existence of the
steady state, but they lie in the region of growth.
Figure 12. Outputs in logariphmic scale.
Figure 13. Outputs in logariphmic scale.
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4.7. SOME CONCLUSIONS OF THE MODEL
Using this simple model, we can see that the presence of the shadow sector
inuences both the ocially registered and the factual output of the economy.
It was shown how the government could inuence the dynamics of output in
the ocial sector altering the level of taxation, because this changes rms'
incentives to produce in the shadow economy. There exists only a restricted
interval over which the tax level can be changed to provide for stationary or
cyclical development of the regular economy.
Using this model one can give some policy recommendations. Taking into
account the performance of the Russian economy, the tax burden seems to
be too heavy for producers. In order to stimulate growth it is necessary to
decrease the rates of some taxes. Depending on the weight of dierent taxes
implicit in  , the government could decrease the prot tax, the value-added
tax, and the employer payroll tax. (For instance, it could decrease the value-
added tax (20%) to 15%, and simultaneously the prot tax (35%) to 25%).
Similar conclusions have been made by other researchers as well. For exam-
ple, Egorova and Petrov (eGOROWA I pETROW (1996)) note that Russia has
too high a tax rate in comparison with such countries as Sweden, Denmark
and the USA.
Aside from the mentioned taxes, other scal policies (e. g., tax immunity
and high payroll taxes) can lead to a decline as well.
As was mentioned above, a decline in the ocial sector can accompany
growth in aggregate output. In this case, growth stimulation can lead to
unanticipated outcomes. A decline in both sectors is possible too; eliminat-
ing its causes (for instance, very high taxes) will lead to an increase in ocial
output. It is likely that as a result ocial wages will increase and, as a conse-
quence, labor productivity will increase too. Those outcomes may also lead to
growth. Here one can see the connection with the 10th decline mechanism:
the partial shift of output from the ocial sector to the shadow one does not
lead to growth.
The linearity of the production function F on registered output is, of
course, a strong simplication. It demarcates much too sharply growth and
decline patterns. We think, however, that the function does not distort the
qualitative picture of dynamics.
It was important for us to show possible outcomes in the presence of a
shadow economy: what may happen and under what conditions, what actions
are necessary for growth stimulation, and what forces the government must
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take into account in order to stimulate growth and consumption.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We considered two models explaining the role in output decline played by
collectivist labor relations in the old sector and the presence of the shadow
economy. These aspects of the Russian economy in transition, despite their
importance, have been studied insuciently. In Sections 1 and 2, we tried to
nd a place for these two phenomena among the many causes of transforma-
tional decline highlighted by other economists.
In Section 3 we developed the notion of collectivist relations in an equi-
librium model of labor markets and studied its implications for patterns of
decline and growth. The model is intentionally simplied to give a clear ex-
planation of such features of the output collapse in Russia | as an extremely
low ocial wage rate in the state sector, and labor hoarding. This model re-
veals the imperfection of existing data and suggests some concrete questions
that can be addressed in further empirical studies. One such question is the
nature of the relationship between factual wage rates (i. e. wages and benets
per unit of the factual time of work) in the old sector and in the new sector
in the transition, and in the pre-transitional economy.
Understanding this relationship would allow us to explain, for instance,
why property redistribution has not lead to serious social conict or why and
how rms might evolve from the old to the new sector.
The model suggests that government policy could be less preoccupied by
the unemployment problem. Strengthening management control in state en-
terprises would lead to an increase in the outow of the work force from the
old sector, to a rise of the labor supply in the new sector, and as a result,
to a decrease in the enormous gap between factual and registered employ-
ment/wages in the old sector. This will create the preconditions both for a
one-time output increase and for long-run economic growth.
In Section 4 we considered a dynamic model in which production was
distributed between registered and shadow activities. The model can serve
as a benchmark to consider in a common framework problems of the budget
decit, the output decline, and the shadow economy. Using dierent regimes
of taxation, we simulated paths of the shadow and the ocially registered
sectors. The model shows that dynamic patterns (monotonic growth, mono-
tonic decline, and oscillations) in both the ocially registered sector and the
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economy in aggregate essentially depend on taxation policies.
REFERENCES
aNALIZ TENDENCIJ RAZWITIQ REGIONOW rOSSII W 1992{1995 GG. rOSSIQ. pROGRAMMA
eWROPEJSKOGO SO@ZA tasis. kONTRAKT BIS/95/321/057, 1996, mOSKWA, MART.
gLAZXEW, s. (1995). pERSPEKTIWY \KONOMI^ESKOGO ROSTA W 1996 GODU. wOPROSY
\KONOMIKI 5.
eGOROWA, e.n., pETROW,`.a. (1996). oCENKA POLNOJ STAWKI NALOGOOBLOVENIQ DOBAWLENNOJ
STOIMOSTI W rOSSII I ZARUBEVNYH STRANAH. |KONOMIKA I MATEMATI^ESKIE METODY
32 (2), 54{66.
kOLODKO, g. (1993). pOLITIKA FINANSOWOJ STABILIZACII I PROBLEMY \KONOMI^ESKOGO
ROSTA. wOPROSY \KONOMIKI 6, 7.
kRY[TANOWSKAQ, o. (1997). w ^XIH RUKAH SOBSTWENNOSTX. aRGUMENTY I FAKTY 15,
1,5.
mOW[OWI^, s.m. (1992). nERAWNOWESNAQ \KONOMIKA S KOMPENSIRU@]IM SPROSOM.
|KONOMIKA I MATEMATI^ESKIE METODY 28 (4), 598{611.
mONITORING SOCIALXNO-\KONOMI^ESKOJ SITUACII I SOSTOQNIQ RYNKOW TRUDA s.-pETER-
BURGA. 1996,  3-4.
pOLTEROWI^, w.m. (1990). |KONOMI^ESKOE RAWNOWESIE I HOZQJSTWENNYJ MEHANIZM,
nAUKA, mOSKWA.
pOLTEROWI^,w.m. (1995). rACIONIROWANIE KREDITA, INFLQCIQ I TRANSFORMACIONNYJ
SPAD. |KONOMIKA I MATEMATI^ESKIE METODY 31 (3), 50.
pOLTEROWI^,w.m. (1996). tRANSFORMACIONNYJ SPAD W rOSSII. |KONOMIKA I MATEMATI^ESKIE
METODY 32 (1), 54.
sAKS, d. (1994). rYNO^NAQ \KONOMIKA I rOSSIQ. |KONOMIKA, mOSKWA.
sIMAGIN, `. (1998). oB OCENKAH MAS[TABOW DOPOLNITELXNOJ ZANQTOSTI NASELENIQ.
wOPROSY \KONOMIKI 1, 99{104.
hAHULINA, l. (1996). pOWEDENIE RABOTNIKOW NA RYNKE TRUDA W USLOWIQH PEREHODA K
RYNO^NOJ \KONOMIKE. sOCIALXNAQ POLITIKA W PERIOD PEREHODA K RYNKU: PROBLEMY
I RE[ENIQ. mOSKOWSKIJ cENTR kARNEGI, mOSKWA.
Aghion, P., and Blanchard, O. J. (1994). On the speed of transition in Central Europe.
In: NBER Macroeconomics Annual. Ed. by S. Fischer and J. J. Rotemberg, MIT Press,
Cambrige, pp. 283{320.
Atkeson, A., and Kehoe, P. J. (1996). Social insurance and transition. International Eco-
nomic Review 37 (2), 377{401.
Atkeson, A., and Kehoe, P. J. (1997). Industry evolution and transition: a neoclassical
benchmark. Working Paper 6005, NBER.
Aukutsionek, S., and Kapeliushnikov R. (1996). Transition economy and ownership eects.
Russian Economic Barometer 5 (4), 21{45.
Azariadis (1993). Inertemporal Macroeconomics. Blackwell, Oxford and Cambridge.
52
References
Benassy, J. P. (1986). Macroeconomics: An Introduction to Non-Walrasian Approach.
Academic Press, New York.
Blanchar, O., and Kremer, M. (1997). Disorganization. Quarterly Journal of Economics
112 (1), 1091{1126.
Brada, J. C., and King, A. E. (1992). Is there a J-Curve for the economic transition from
socialism to capitalism? Economics of Planning 25 (1), 37{35.
Calvo, G. A., and Coricelli, F. (1993). Output collapse in Eastern Europe. IMF Sta Papers
40 (1), 32{52.
Chadha, B., and Coricelli, F. (1994). Fiscal constraints and the speed of transition. Dis-
cussion Paper 993. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
Commander, S., and Coricelli F., eds. (1995). Unemployment, Restructuring and the Labor
Market in Eastern Europe and Russia. IBRD, The World Bank, Washington.
Dallago, B. (1994). The irregular economy in transition: features, measurement and scope.
In: Output Decline in Eastern Europe: Unavoidable, External Inuence or Homemade?
Ed. by R. Z. Holzmann et al. IIASA, Luxemburg.
Dewatripont, M., and Maskin, E. (1995). Credit and eciency in centralized and decen-
tralized economies. Review of Economic Studies 62, 541{555.
Dixit, A., and Rob, R. (1994). Risk sharing, adjustment, and trade. Journal of International
Economics 36, 263{287.
Dunne, T., Roberts, M., and Samuelson, L. (1989). The growth and failure of U.S.
manufacturing plants. Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (4), 671{98.
EBRD (1997). Enterprise Performance and Growth. Economic Transition in Eastern Eu-
rope and the Former SU.
Fernandez, R., and Rodrik, D. (1991). Resistance to reform: status quo bias in the presence
of individual-specic uncertainty. The American Economic Review 81 (5), 1146{1155.
Gaerther, W., and Wenig, A., eds. (1985). The economics of the shadow economy. Studies
in Contemporary Economics. Springer-Verlag, Berlin.
Ginsburgh, V., Michel, P., and Padoa Schioppa, F. (1985). Macroeconomic policy in the
presence of an irregular sector. In: The Economics of the Shadow Economy. Ed. by W.
Gaerther, and A.Wenig.
Gomulka, S. (1998). Output: causes of the decline and the recovery. Forthcoming in:
Understanding Transition. Ed. by P. Boone, S. Gomulka, and R. Layard. MIT Press,
Cambridge.
Grossman, G. (1977). The `Second economy' in USSR. Problems of Communism 26 (5),
25{40.
Hart, K. (1987). Informal economy. The New Palgrave: Dictionary of economics. Ed. by
J. Eutwell.
Holzmann, R., Gacs, J., and Winkler, G., eds. (1994). Output Decline in Eastern Europe,
Unavoidable, External Inuence or Homemade? IIASA, Luxemburg.
Johnson, S., Kaufmann, D., and Shleifer, A. (1997). Politics and enrtepreneurship in tran-
sition economies. Working Paper Series 57. The William Davidson Institute, University
of Michigan.
53
References
Kornai, J. (1993). Transformational recession: a general phenomenon examined through
the example of hungary's development. Discussion Paper 1648. Harvard Institute of
Economic Research.
Kornai, J. (1994). Transformational recession: The main gauses. Journal of Comparative
Economics.
Lipton, D., Sachs, J. (1990). Creating a market economy in Eastern Europe. The case of
Poland. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 75{147.
Lucas, R. (1988). On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of Monetary
economics 22, 3{42.
Matveenko, V. (1995). Development with positive externalities: the case of the russian
economy. Journal of Policy Modeling 17 (3), 207{221.
Polterovich, V.M. (1993). Rationing, queues, and the black markets. Econometrica 61
(1), 1{28.
Pyle, D. J. (1989). Tax evasion and the black economy. Hampshire, Macmillan.
Ruhl, C., and Vinogradov, V. (1997). Social cohesion in economic development: employ-
ment and wages. Finish Economic Papers 10 (1), 3{19
Raiser, M. (1997). Soft Budget Constraints and the Fate of Economic Reforms in Transition
Economies and Developing Countries. Mohr, Tubingen.
Rodrik, D. (1992). Making sense of the soviet trade shock in Eastern Europe: a framework
and some estimates. Discussion Paper Series 705. Centre for Economic Policy Research,
London.
Roland, G., and Verdier, T. (1997). Transition and the output fall. Discussion Paper Series
1636. Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.
Rosati, D. (1994). Output decline during transition from plan to market. Economics of
Transition 2 (4), 419{442.
Ruhl, C., and Vinogradov, V. (1996). The blind man's subsidies: output, ination and
unemployment in transition economies | A general framework. East European Series
35. Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna.
Shapiro, C., and Stiglitz, J. (1984). Equilibrium unemployment as a discipline device.
American Economic Review 74 (June), 433{444.
Stahl, D. O., and Alexeev, M. A. (1985). The inuence of black markets on a queuerationed
centrally planned economy. Journal of Economic Theory 35 (2).
Swaan, W. (1996). Behavioural Constraints and the Creation of Markets in Post-Socialist
Economies. In: Economic Institutions, Markets and Competition: Centralization and
Decentralization in the Transformation of Economic Systems. Ed. by B. Dallago and
L.Mittone. Edgar, Cheltenham, Brookeld.
Weitzman, M. (1993). Economic transition: can economic theory help? European Eco-
nomic Review 37 (2/3).
Welisz, S., and Findlay, R. (1986). Central planning and the `second economy' in Soviet-
type systems. The Economic Journal 96 (September), 646{658.
54
